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COMMENT
Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of Campaign Finance
Law
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar that
states may prohibit candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting
campaign donations in order to protect the appearance of judicial integrity.'
For only the third time in its history, the Court upheld a law subjected to strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 2 Many commenta-
tors noted that the opinion employed a heavily watered-down version of strict
scrutiny analysis to reach this result.' Indeed, as Justice Alito's dissent stated,
the judicial ethics canon at issue was "about as narrowly tailored as a burlap
bag."4 As the decision filters down into the lower courts and into other areas of
law, Williams-Yulee's forgiving form of tailoring analysis could unduly dilute
what should be the most protective level of judicial scrutiny. There is already
1. 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1657 (2015).
2. The Court achieved a similar result in both Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1,
39 (2010), andBurson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, When Strict Scrutiny Ceased To Be Strict, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30,
2015, 9:47 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2oi/0 4 /symposium-when-strict-scrutiny
-ceased-to-be-strict [http://perma.cc/9QTJ-8MIEM]; Bob Corn-Revere, For Judges Only,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/o5/symposium
-for-judges-only [http://perma.cc/V93M-APGZ]; Robert D. Durham, Yes, It Can Hurt Just
To Ask, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2015, 1:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2o15/o5
/symposium-yes-it-can-hurt-just-to-ask [http://perma.cc/EH4U-ZVU4]; Noah Feldman,
Roberts Plays Politics by Denying Judges Are Political, BLOOMBERGVIEw (Apr. 29, 2015,
3:07 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2o15-o4-29/roberts-plays-politics-by
-denying-judges-are-political [http://perma.cc/M9SS-FN66]; Ilya Shapiro, The Judicial-
Elections Exception to the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2015, 10:09
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/201 5 /oS/symposium-the-judicial-elections-exception-to
-the-first-amendment [http://perma.cc/BYD9-W43F].
4. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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some evidence, albeit limited, of such dilution.' Taken at face value, then, Wil-
liams-Yulee's tailoring analysis could fundamentally alter First and Fourteenth
6Amendment doctrine.
Williams-Yulee was not a fluke. Rather, it was the result of the Court's
treatment of many campaign finance regulations as core speech restrictions
subject to strict scrutiny. When the overwhelming force of strict scrutiny analy-
sis meets an equally powerful interest, such as judicial integrity, one or the oth-
er must fall. The Court ultimately chose to abandon the former. Yet there is a
legally sound alternative that the Court did not consider. Instead of struggling
within the confines of their strict scrutiny framework, thereby damaging its
structure, the Justices should simply have applied a different framework. This
Comment argues that the Court could have avoided the First Amendment di-
lemma in Williams-Yulee- and could prevent similar dilemmas in the future -
by deciding campaign finance cases under its broader election law doctrine, ra-
ther than its pure First Amendment doctrine.'
The Court's analysis of other aspects of the election process - such as ballot
access, political party activities, and voting rights -has evolved along a differ-
ent track from that of campaign finance. In a series of cases, most notably An-
5. See, e.g., Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 825 F.3d 149, 164 (3 d Cir. 2016) ("By remand-
ing for an application of strict scrutiny we are not 'dooming' the Statutes as the dissent sug-
gests . . . . Recently, the Supreme Court, in a First Amendment challenge to Florida's judicial
conduct rules regarding campaign solicitations, held that the regulation at issue was 'one of
the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny."'); Hodge v. Talkin,
799 F.3 d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("The Supreme Court recently, in its just-completed
Term, strongly reinforced the [judicial integrity] interest's vitality, along with the govern-
ment's considerable latitude to secure its realization even through speech-restrictive
measures.").
6. As applied to the federal government, the tailoring analysis could also alter jurisprudence
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
7. By "pure" or "traditional" First Amendment doctrine, I mean the analysis that courts apply
to garden-variety free speech or free association cases. Generally speaking, "[1]aws that bur-
den political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove
that the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that in-
terest."' Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). The Court applies a similar analysis to burdens on free asso-
ciation. See Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1989). The idea of a
"traditional" analysis is, by necessity, "an egregious oversimplification"; regulations "are
measured by... context-specific First Amendment principles -rather than some undiffer-
entiated, 'general' First Amendment rule." Richard H. Pildes, Elections as a Distinct Sphere
Under the First Amendment, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS
UNITED 19, 28 (Monica Youn ed., 2011). Similarly, the phrase "election law doctrine" is a
simplifying shorthand, as discussed infra.
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derson v. Celebrezze' and Burdick v. Takushi,' the Supreme Court developed a
flexible balancing test to determine the constitutionality of most election regu-
lations.o The Burdick test, as this balancing act is sometimes called, is the clos-
est standard the Court has to a Grand Unified Theory of Election Law." By
folding campaign finance into the Burdick framework, the Court could decide
cases like Williams-Yulee without invoking strict scrutiny, and without creating
negative repercussions throughout First and Fourteenth Amendment law.
This Comment enters an existing debate over how courts should analyze
campaign finance laws and other election regulations. Judges and authors have
noted that the Court has left campaign finance out of the jurisprudential
framework for election law cases.12 Scholars have sparred over whether this sit-
8. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (stating that "[c]onstitutional challenges to specific provisions of a
State's election laws ... cannot be resolved by any 'litmus-paper test' that will separate valid
from invalid restrictions," and setting out for the first time the balancing test now used to
evaluate many election regulations (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))).
9. 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (elaborating on the standard from Anderson, and stating that
"when [First and Fourteenth Amendment] rights are subjected to 'severe' restrictions, the
regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance,"'
but "when a state election law provision imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory re-
strictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, 'the State's important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions" (quoting Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); Anderson 460 U.S. at 788)).
lo. The test developed to its current formulation in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,
553 U.S. 181, 189-91 (2008) (plurality opinion).
ii. Physicists use the phrase "grand unified theory" to describe theories that attempt to unite
the four fundamental forces of nature: the strong and weak nuclear forces, electromag-
netism, and gravity. See NEIL DEGRAssE TYSON ET AL., WELCOME TO THE UNIVERSE: AN AS-
TROPHYSICAL TOUR 351 (2016). While no other scholar appears to have used this phrase to
describe the Court's balancing test in Burdick, some have noted that this test is a unified
form of analysis employed across many areas of election law. E.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf
& Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodo-
logical Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 507, 510-11 (20o8); Nicho-
las 0. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 292 (2014). The
Court also does not currently analyze gerrymandering or "one person, one vote" claims un-
der the Burdick test. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306
(2016) ("[T]he Constitution permits deviation [from one person, one vote] when it is justi-
fied by 'legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy."' (ci-
tation omitted)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (subjecting racial gerrymanders
to strict scrutiny).
12. VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cit. 1998) (Brunetti, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 350 (D. Conn.
2009), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010); James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional
Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U. L. REv. 235, 243 n.5o (1999); see also
R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate
Review, and "Reasonableness" Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 307-09, 377-87 (2016) (compar-
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uation should be changed and, if so, what campaign finance doctrine should
look like.13 At least two authors have directly advocated for using some form of
balancing analysis in campaign finance challenges, though neither proposes us-
ing the Burdick test." By explicitly arguing that the Court should fold cam-
paign finance law into the Burdick test, this Comment adds a different perspec-
tive to a growing literature debating whether and how to unify the domains of
election law. It also provides a new way to examine Williams-Yulee itself. As
Williams-Yulee is a relatively new decision, it has not yet generated substantial
academic scholarship. Several early commentators lamented the Court's ap-
proach to strict scrutiny analysis, but many of them simply argued that the
Court should have decided the case the other way." This Comment, by con-
trast, situates Williams-Yulee in a broader framework, reexamining the divide
between the campaign finance and election law doctrines.
This Comment proceeds in two Parts. Part I discusses the Court's ruling in
Williams-Yulee and explores how the analysis developed to this point. It then
discusses Williams-Yulee's potential to affect First and Fourteenth Amendment
cases. Part II lays out an alternative jurisprudential path. It describes how cam-
paign finance law diverged from the rest of election law, explains the modern
Burdick test, and shows how the test's application would affect the analysis in
ing the "exacting scrutiny" used in campaign finance cases with the "reasonableness balanc-
ing" test used in voting rights cases).
13. For pieces arguing that campaign finance does not involve the same need to regulate elec-
toral structure that underlies the Burdick test, see, for example, John 0. McGinnis, Neutral
Principles and Some Campaign Finance Problems, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841, 907-11 (2016);
and Geoffrey R. Stone, "Electoral Exceptionalism" and the First Amendment, in MONEY, POLI-
TICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED, supra note 7, at 37, 51-52. For au-
thors who dispute this premise, see, for example, ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 64-65
(2014); and Pildes, supra note 7, at 26.
14. Jessica Medina calls for courts to strike "a balance between the various potential governmen-
tal interests and the definition of corruption attributable to the speaker." Jessica Medina,
When Rhetoric Obscures Reality: The Definition of Corruption and Its Shortcomings, 48 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 597, 645 (2015) (footnote omitted). Meanwhile, Kenneth Potter suggests using an
undue burden standard similar to that used in abortion jurisprudence. Kenneth G. Potter,
Note, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Political Speech of the Common Voter Is
Promoted Through Campaign Finance Reform, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 151, 171 (2002). Other au-
thors believe that courts should import aspects of campaign finance doctrine into voting
rights cases, rather than the other way around. See Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Vot-
ing Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 471, 471-72 (2016); Recent Case, Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, 472 F3 d 949 ( 7 th Cir. 2oo7), 120 HARY. L. REV. 1980, 1982-85
(2007).
15. See sources cited supra note 3. One case comment suggests that the Court should have decid-
ed Williams-Yulee on due process grounds. See Leading Case, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), 129 HARv. L. REV. 231, 239-40 (2015).
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Williams-Yulee and other campaign finance cases. Part II also addresses the
most common theoretical arguments against using the Burdick test in this area.
1. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND STRICT SCRUTINY, BEFORE AND AFTER
WILLIAMS-YULEE
The Court's opinion in Williams-Yulee is, in some sense, the culmination of
a longtime trend. For decades, the Court has treated campaign finance as a
pure speech and association issue, rather than as a question of election regula-
tion.' 6 During the Roberts Court years, the conservative majority has steadily
ratcheted up its scrutiny of campaign finance laws." The regulation at issue in
Williams-Yulee posed a problem for the Court's campaign finance doctrine: it
served a particularly compelling interest but was not narrowly tailored in the
way traditionally required to sustain speech restrictions. To save Florida's solici-
tation ban, the Court chose to relax its rigid tailoring analysis, a move that will
have significant ripple effects throughout First and Fourteenth Amendment
law.
A. The Williams-Yulee Decision
In 2009, Lanell Williams-Yulee ("Yulee"), a candidate for county court
judge in Hillsborough County, sent out a mass mailing.s The mailing intro-
duced her to voters, described her qualifications, and asked for "[a] n early con-
tribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $5oo."' 9 Yulee also posted the letter on her
campaign's website. 20 The Florida Bar filed suit against Yulee, claiming that she
violated Florida Canon of Judicial Ethics 7C(l), which prohibits any candidate
"for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candi-
dates" from "personally solicit[ing] campaign funds. "21
Yulee, however, claimed that Canon 7C() was a content-based restriction
on her speech, and that preventing her from personally soliciting donations
16. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (plurality opinion); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 25, 44-45 (1976) (per curiam).
17. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law's Path in the Roberts Court's First Decade: A Sharp Right
Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1603-04 (2016).
18. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1663 (2015).
ig. Id. (citation omitted).
20. Id. For a copy of the email, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31a-32a, Williams-Yulee, 135
S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499).
21. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7C(1) (2016).
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through a mass mailing violated the First Amendment. 22 The Florida Supreme
Court, 2  and then the U.S. Supreme Court,24 agreed with Yulee's characteriza-
tion of the restriction, but disagreed with her conclusion. Both courts applied
strict scrutiny but upheld Canon 7C(i) as a narrowly tailored means of protect-
ing the integrity-and the appearance of integrity-of the judiciary.25 For the
justice system to work, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned, the public must be-
lieve that justice will be dispensed fairly by neutral magistrates.26 States may
foster such public confidence by prohibiting judicial candidates from soliciting
campaign donations without violating the First Amendment.27
For a campaign finance case, the Court's reasoning was as unusual as the
outcome. The majority cared so deeply about Florida's interest-preserving ju-
dicial integrity-that it simply could not conduct the truly "strict" strict scruti-
ny analysis that the Court typically applies. 28 To reconcile its view of the state
interest with the level of scrutiny required by its precedents, the Court empha-
sized how little Canon 7C(1) burdens judicial candidates' speech. It asserted
that the canon "aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary" -solicitation of contributions by
judicial candidates themselves.2 9 It also noted that the canon applied evenly to
all judicial candidates.o In the end, the Court insisted that "Canon 7C(1) re-
stricts a narrow slice of speech,"" giving candidates near-total freedom to re-
ceive money through their campaign committees and to speak about political
issues.32 To the majority, it seems, the solicitation ban was simply not a great
burden.
22. Initial Brief of Respondent at 12-21, Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 2014)(No. SC11-265).
23. Fla. Bar, 138 So. 3d at 387.
24. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673.
2S. Id.; Fla. Bar, 138 So. 3d at 387.
26. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667-68.
27. Id. at 1672.
28. See, e.g., Corn-Revere, supra note 3. As Corn-Revere notes, strict scrutiny "has been de-
scribed as 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"' because the government must "prove that the
measure is necessary to serve a compelling interest and that it employs the least restrictive
means of doing so." Id.
29. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1670.
32. Id. at 1672.
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B. Williams-Yulee in Doctrinal Context
The Court's analysis in Williams-Yulee was so unusual because, under its
established First Amendment doctrine, the Court should have struck down
Canon 7C(1). For decades, some Justices have advocated for subjecting all
campaign finance regulations to strict scrutiny." The Court has refused to go
this far," instead enforcing a fundamental divide. Campaign finance laws that
directly restrict speech, such as expenditure limits and regulations on candidate
communication, receive strict scrutiny and are almost uniformly struck down.s
Laws that do not impose such "onerous" constraints on speech, such as cam-
paign contribution limits, public financing schemes, and disclosure require-
ments, are subject to slightly lesser burdens. 6 Contribution limits, for in-
stance, need only be "closely drawn" to serve a "sufficiently important
interest."3 7
While formally maintaining this divide, the Roberts Court has become
more willing to impose strict scrutiny, asserting that challenged laws create
content- or speaker-based restrictions on speech. For example, in Davis v. FEC,
the Court struck down a provision that raised campaign contribution caps for
candidates with self-funded opponents ;31 then, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, it invalidated a law that increased public financing
grants in response to privately funded opponents' spending.3 9 The Court treat-
ed both of these provisions as speaker-based restrictions on the self- or private-
ly financed candidates' speech.40 And the Court struck down a ban on corporate
independent expenditures in Citizens United v. FEC because it "impose[d] re-
33. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 267 (20o6) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("I would overrule Buckley and subject both the contribution and expendi-
ture restrictions of Act 64 to strict scrutiny, which they would fail."); Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm'n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I begin
with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant difference between campaign
contributions and expenditures: Both forms of speech are central to the First Amendment.
Curbs on protected speech, we have repeatedly said, must be strictly scrutinized.").
34. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014) ("We therefore need not parse the differ-
ences between the two standards [of review] in this case.").
35. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734-35 (2011).
36. Id. at 735.
37. Id.
38. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (20o8).
39. Bennett, 564 U.S. at 755.
40. Id. at 737; Davis, 554 U.S. at 738.
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strictions on certain disfavored speakers."4 ' Even when it has not applied strict
scrutiny, the Court has become increasingly hostile toward campaign finance
laws, invalidating the very sorts of regulations that it had previously upheld.4 2
In Williams-Yulee, the parties agreed that Canon 7C(1) was a content-based
restriction on judicial candidates' speech.43 Because solicitations are "inter-
twined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech'" the canon "in-
fringe [d] Yulee's freedom to discuss candidates and public issues - namely, her-
self and her qualifications to be a judge."44 The Court had already assumed that
speech restrictions on judicial candidates are subject to strict scrutiny.45 Given
all this, and given that laws rarely survive strict scrutiny, the solicitation ban
would normally have been struck down.
But the Court did not follow its usual path, dismissing what are normally
statute-killing objections. The dissenting Justices rightly pointed out that Can-
on 7C(1) bans solicitations in any form and of any person-without heed to
whether the solicitations threaten judicial integrity.46 In other words, the ban is
over-inclusive. The Court swept away this concern, stating that, "most problems
arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not con-
fine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form." Canon 7C(1) also
contains numerous loopholes: close friends may solicit on a candidate's behalf,
and candidates can learn who donated and write them thank-you notes." The
Court likewise rejected this argument, saying that "the First Amendment im-
poses no freestanding 'underinclusiveness limitation,"' and that states "need not
address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop."4 9 This is far from narrow
tailoring, at least as the Court has normally defined the term.
In order to maintain public confidence in judicial integrity, the Court had to
minimize the burden that Canon 7C(1) places on judicial candidates' speech.
41- 558 U. S. 310, 341 (2o1o).
42. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (striking down aggregate federal cam-
paign contribution limits); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236-37 (20o6) (striking down
state contribution limits).
43. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1664 (2015).
44. Id. at 1665.
45. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
46. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1679 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1671 (majority opinion).
48. Brief for Petitioner at 18-20, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499); Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., An Aid To Understanding Canon 7, OFF. ST. CTS. ADMIN. 57-59
(Oct. 1, 2016), http://flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/3o4/urlt/canon 7update.pdf [http://
perma.cc/53PG-7MPQ].
49. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668 (emphasis added).
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This resulted in a form of strict scrutiny analysis alien to modern free speech
jurisprudence- one that could seep into other areas of First and Fourteenth
Amendment law. As Justice Kennedy's Williams-Yulee dissent warned, the
Court's tailoring analysis could greatly weaken the bulwark that strict scrutiny
erects against government overreach.so
C. The Impact of Williams-Yulee: Early Evidence
At first glance, Williams-Yulee might seem like an aberration. After all, one
might think that, as judges, the Justices are likely to be more concerned with
maintaining the appearance of judicial integrity than of legislative or executive
integrity." Indeed, the Court has made efforts to distinguish judicial elections
from other elections. The Williams-Yulee majority opinion rejected compari-
sons to cases like Citizens United, arguing that politicians are expected to re-
spond to their constituents' desires, while judges must remain neutral.52 Ulti-
mately, the Court said, states have a broader interest in preserving the
appearance of judicial integrity than in preventing the appearance of legislative
and executive corruption." The decision itself was tightly aligned to the spe-
cifics of regulating campaign finance in judicial elections. In this sense, Wil-
liams-Yulee looks like a mere doctrinal oddity.
But the case is not quite the outlier it appears to be. Justice Thomas, for in-
stance, suggested (disapprovingly) that Williams-Yulee is part of a larger "ten-
dency to relax purportedly higher standards of review for less-preferred
rights."" Moreover, since many other areas of First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment law employ versions of the strict scrutiny test, much of the Court's analy-
sis in Williams-Yulee could have ripple effects beyond free speech cases. For in-
stance, the.Court held that laws should not fail strict scrutiny simply because
they do not restrict all relevant activity. 5 At the same time, the Court held that
even strict scrutiny allows states to regulate more activity than is necessary to
so. Id. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 3.
52. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667 (majority opinion).
53. Id.
54. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. This means laws can be underinclusive; even under strict
scrutiny, they need not target the whole universe of speech that their underlying interests
would seem to require.
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accomplish their aims.56 These are general statements about how to conduct
strict scrutiny analysis; they are not necessarily limited to a particular context.
It is therefore not surprising that Williams-Yulee's weakening of strict scru-
tiny has already had an impact. This reasoning was felt most immediately in
other judicial campaign finance cases. Several such cases cited Williams-Yulee in
upholding a range of judicial ethics laws." Outside of this sphere, the D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, made liberal use of the Williams-Yulee opinion to justi-
fy upholding the federal ban on political contributions from government con-
tractors. 8
Beyond campaign finance, the analysis in Williams-Yulee has also already
begun to spread into other areas of First Amendment law. For instance, courts
have utilized its holdings on under- and over-inclusiveness, as well as its re-
minder that some laws can survive strict scrutiny, in a variety of decisions.
These decisions involve everything from commercial solicitation, to inspec-
tion regimes for child pornography,60 to noise prohibitions in an abortion buff-
er zone law,61 to certain forms of traffic offenses,62 to restrictions on doctors'
ability to ask whether their patients own firearms.63 This extensive use of Wil-
liams-Yulee demonstrates the case's impact on the broader world of campaign
finance-and general First and Fourteenth Amendment-jurisprudence. With
56. Id. at 1671. Additionally, while the Court made much of the difference between judges and
politicians, the reasoning in Williams-Yulee could be applied to other campaign finance cas-
es. As the Court put it: "The concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily
reduce to precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary record. But no
one denies that it is genuine and compelling." Id. at 1667. This is similar to rhetoric used un-
der the appearance-of-corruption standard in other campaign finance cases prior to the
Roberts Court's heyday. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (20o6); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-91 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Ohio Council 8 Am. Fed'n State, Cry., & Mun. Emps. v. Husted, 814 F.3 d 329, 340(6th Cit. 2016) (lack of partisan affiliation on ballot); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176,
1182-86 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (prohibitions on solicitation of campaign funds and on
endorsing or campaigning for others); O'Toole v. O'Connor, 802 F.3d 783, 789-91 (6th Cir.
2015) (temporal restrictions on solicitation and receipt of contributions); see also Hodge v.
Talkin, 799 F.3 d 1145, 1167, 1169-70 (D.C. Cit. 2015) (analyzing and upholding a prohibition
on protests in the U.S. Supreme Court plaza).
58. Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 26-30, 34 (D.C. Cit. 2015) (en banc).
5. Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 128 F. Supp. 3d
597, 616-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
6o. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 825 F.3 d 149, 164 (3d Cir. 2016).
61. March v. Mills, No. 2:15-CV- 5 15-NT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67087, at *24 (D. Me. May 23,
2016).
62. Raef v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
63. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1195 (ith Cir. 2015).
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a diluted strict scrutiny standard, states might gain greater leeway to impinge
on a range of freedoms under both the First Amendment and the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This could weak-
en protections ranging from the right to marry to the right to vote.
II. REIMAGINING CAMPAIGN FINANCE AS AN ELECTION LAW ISSUE
Williams-Yulee illustrates the need to rethink campaign finance jurispru-
dence. Since Buckley, the Court has subjected campaign finance restrictions to
its pure freedom of speech and freedom of association doctrines.64 Yet the rest
of election law doctrine has developed separately. Recognizing the need for
government regulation of voting and ballot access systems, the Court adopted
the Burdick sliding-scale approach to constitutional challenges. Section II.A
discusses how campaign finance and election law diverged. Section II.B shows
how the Burdick test works today. It then applies the Burdick test to Williams-
Yulee to show how the test could change courts' analyses in campaign finance
cases. Section II.C then takes on the main theoretical objections to unifying
election law doctrine.
A. The Free Speech/Election Law Divide
The Supreme Court's approach to election law cases has changed signifi-
cantly over the years. The Warren Court revolutionized many areas of election
law, subjecting voting rights," ballot access,66 and redistricting6 7 regulations to
First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis. In the process, the Court employed
what today we would call strict scrutiny.6 8 Then, in the Burger Court years, the
64. See Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam).
65. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 670 (1966).
66. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 34 (1968).
67. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
68. See Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31 ("In determining whether the State has power to place such une-
qual burdens on minority groups where rights of this kind are at stake, the decisions of this
Court have consistently held that 'only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a sub-
ject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms."' (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963))); Harper, 383 U.S. at 670
("We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under
the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined."); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 ("Especially since the
right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.").
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Justices began to pull back on the rights-protective decisions made in the
1960s. "It is very unlikely," the Court said in Storer v. Brown, "that all or even a
large portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cas-
es."69 It recognized that, "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regu-
lation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, ra-
ther than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.""o
In the 198os and 199os, the Court followed the logic of Storer and once
again transformed its election law doctrine. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court
reaffirmed that states needed leeway to develop election regulations and deter-
mined that most "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" on the electoral
process would pass constitutional muster." The Court therefore developed "a
lenient balancing test" to analyze election regulations .72 Upon further refine-
ment, this became today's Burdick test.
The Court has not followed this path in campaign finance cases. Instead, it
has used the same rigid analysis since its seminal 1976 decision in Buckley v.
Valeo.74 In Buckley, plaintiffs challenged Congress's new campaign finance law,
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which placed limits on po-
litical contributions and expenditures.7 ' The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit grounded its constitutional evaluation of FECA in the same need (and
power) to regulate that the Supreme Court had identified in its other election
law cases.7 ' However, the Supreme Court did not see it this way, instead con-
ducting a pure First Amendment analysis.
69- 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
70. Id.
71. 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
72. Derfner & Hebert, supra note 14, at 481.
73. Id. at 482-83; see Crawford v. Marion Cry. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190-91 (2008) (plurali-
ty opinion) (laying out the Burdick test and clarifying that, "[h]owever slight [a] burden
may appear, ... it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests 'sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation' (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992))).
74. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
75. Id. at 12-13.
76. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841-42 (D.C. Cit. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam).
77. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
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The Buckley Court saw campaign expenditure limits as direct restrictions on
speech and association; it therefore subjected them to strict scrutiny." But be-
cause it viewed campaign contribution limits as a lesser infringement on these
rights, the Court developed a less demanding standard: states must "demon-
strate[] a sufficiently important interest and employ[] means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."" Using these tests,
the Court found that Congress's interest in preventing corruption and its ap-
pearance could sustain FECA's contribution restrictions,8 0 but not the expendi-
ture limits."' The Court continues to employ the strict and closely drawn scru-
tiny tests in campaign finance cases today.82
It is clear that election law doctrine and campaign finance doctrine, both of
which began as skeptical of government regulation, have diverged. Why they
have diverged is less certain. Perhaps the Court simply never saw campaign fi-
nance as related to other electoral regulations." While we may see them all as
part of a larger election law sphere today, election law was not a coherent field
of study when the Court decided Buckley and created the Burdick test.84 Prior to
the 1990s, scholars and courts alike treated election issues as straightforward
extensions of the many constitutional law doctrines that applied to political
regulations." The Court may not have had a theoretical architecture to connect
campaign finance with voting rights and ballot access issues.
78. See id. at 44-45 ("[T]he constitutionality of [the expenditure limit] turns on whether the
governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.").
79. Id. at 25.
80. Id. at 26-27.
81. Id. at 45.
82. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445-46 (2014) (plurality opinion).
83. Several election law scholars have made a similar point. See Edward B. Foley, Election Law
and the Roberts Court: An Introduction, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 733-34 (2007) ("[I]t maybe un-
fair for scholars who specialize in election law to expect the Court to have an overarching vi-
sion of election law that guides their resolution of disputes in the distinctive areas of cam-
paign finance, legislative redistricting, and voting procedures."); Pildes, supra note 7, at 29
("There had been little academic development or sustained public debate of the First
Amendment perspectives surrounding regulation of elections at the moment of the Court's
momentous and baptismal engagement with these issues in Buckley. Thus, the Court as-
sessed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 by assimilating general principles of First
Amendment adjudication. . . .").
84. Election law did not develop into its own area of study until the 199os. See Heather K.
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But why maintain the split now? It is most likely that the Court believes, as
some scholars do, that government does not have the same structural interest
in regulating campaign finance that it does for other aspects of the election pro-
cess." Section II.C will address this assumption. Today, however, the judiciary
now uses two forms of analysis: traditional First Amendment analysis in cam-
paign finance cases, and the Burdick test in other election cases.
B. Applying the Burdick Test to Campaign Finance
To understand how the Burdick test would affect campaign finance cases,
we must first understand how the Burdick test operates. Rather than use a "lit-
mus test" to separate valid from invalid regulations, courts confronting election
laws employ a more open-ended analysis." First, a court "must weigh 'the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate."' The
court then balances the burden against the state's interests."9 As part of this in-
quiry, the court must examine the fit between those interests and the laws
passed to further them.90 Under this "flexible standard," severe burdens are
subject to strict scrutiny, while lesser burdens receive lesser scrutiny.9 ' Howev-
er, the test is essentially a sliding scale; regardless of how slight the burden on
constitutional rights, the court must weigh the burden against the state's inter-
ests.92
For a good example of the Burdick test, consider the Court's decision in
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc." In that case, Colorado
had passed a number of restrictions regarding who could circulate petitions to
put initiatives on the ballot.94 The Court acknowledged that petition circulation
"is 'core political speech,' because it involves 'interactive communication con-
86. See infra text accompanying notes 135-139.
87. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (plurality opinion) (de-
scribing the "balancing approach" to review of election laws).




gi. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190-91, 190 n.8.
92. Id. at 191.
93. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
94. Id. at 188-89.
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cerning political change."' 9 However, it also recognized the need for election
regulation" and therefore applied the Burdick test." The Court found that the
regulations "significantly inhibit[ed] communication with voters about pro-
posed political change."" It cited evidence from the district court record to
show that the regulations severely limited the number of people able and will-
ing to circulate petitions.99 The Court did not specify a level of scrutiny, instead
asking "whether the State's concerns warrant the reduction."'" Ultimately,
after examining these concerns, the Court determined that the regulations were
"not warranted by" Colorado's interests."0 '
The Court has used this same balancing test to examine a wide swath of
election laws: voter ID requirements,"0 2 prohibitions on fusion candidacies, 0 3
bans on write-in voting,'0 4 early filing deadlines for independent candidates,'0 s
and laws that force parties to either open up primaries to non-party mem-
bersio6 or restrict them to those in the party.'0o The Burdick test is thus the
closest thing we have to a Grand Unified Theory of election law.
As both courts' and scholars'o' have pointed out, however, this unified
framework does not encompass campaign finance. The reasoning of the Wil-
95. Id. at 186 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
96. Id. at 187.
97. See id. at 192 ("We have several times said 'no litmus-paper test' will separate valid ballot-
access provisions from invalid interactive speech restrictions; we have come upon 'no substi-
tute for the hard judgments that must be made."' (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974))).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 193-94, 197-98; see also id. at 199-200 (discussing the severity of the identification
badge requirement's effect on political speech rights).
ioo. Id. at 193.
i0i. Id. at 192.
102. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 199-202 (20o8) (plurality opinion).
io3. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353-54, 357-59 (1997). Fusion bans
"prohibit a candidate from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party."
Id. at 354.
104. Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 433-34 (1992).
1os. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-90 (1983).
106. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570-73 (2000).
107. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210-11, 213-15 (1986).
108. See, e.g., VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3 d 1215, 1221 (9 th Cit. 1998) (noting that the Supreme
Court "has not applied this [weighing] test to campaign contribution restrictions").
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liams-Yulee decision was disappointing not only because it diluted strict scruti-
ny, but also because it missed a prime opportunity to subsume campaign fi-
nance doctrine into the Court's broader election law doctrine. The main benefit
of this move is that the Burdick test allows a court to consider the burden that a
particular regulation places on First or Fourteenth Amendment rights before de-
termining the level of scrutiny it will apply. Traditional First Amendment doc-
trine, on the other hand, tends to sort laws into one broad category or another
(for example, content-based restrictions, speaker-based restrictions, or re-
strictions on speech in public forums 1 o), each of which has a predefined level
of scrutiny. The real discussion of how much a law burdens First Amendment
rights - and sometimes even the fine-grained discussion of how a law burdens
these rights - does not take place until the tailoring analysis, after the level of
scrutiny has already been set and the government's interest examined.' In-
deed, the whole purpose of the least-restrictive-means test in strict scrutiny
cases is "to ensure that" protected activity "is restricted no further than neces-
sary to achieve the goal."112 The Burdick test, by contrast, allows courts to con-
sider the law's scope from the outset.
Using the Burdick test in Williams-Yulee would have freed the majority to
invoke something less than strict scrutiny. As discussed in Part I, much of the
Court's tailoring analysis was actually an attempt to show how little the solici-
tation ban burdened judicial candidates' speech.113 This parallels the Burdick
test's focus on the "magnitude" of the injury a law imposes.114 In particular, the
Court asserted that what appeared to be major loopholes in Florida's ban were
actually attempts to focus as narrowly as possible on what the Florida legisla-
ture saw as the threat to public confidence in judicial integrity.1 s Conversely, a
complete ban on speaking or spending money-like the provision the Court
log. Bopp, supra note 12, at 243 n.50, 296; Curtis K. Tao, Note, A Compelling Opportunity To Re-
think the Flawed Evolution of Contribution Speech, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1345, 1348 n.15, 1376
(1999).
no. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
Tennessee statute at issue implicates "three central concerns in our First Amendment juris-
prudence: regulation of political speech, regulation of speech in a public forum, and regula-
tion based on the content of the speech").
in. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668-72 (2015); United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549-51 (2012) (plurality opinion).
112. Ashcroftv. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
114. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
789 (1983)).
n5. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668-70.
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confronted in Citizens United" 6-would impose a much heavier burden and
thus would likely still be subject to strict scrutiny.
In addition to the "magnitude" -or severity-of the burden, the Burdick
test lets courts consider the "character"-or form-of the harm."' The judicial
canon at issue in Williams-Yulee focused solely on candidates' solicitation of con-
tributions, as opposed to supporters' ability to give contributions".. or judicial
candidates' ability to announce their views on political issues."' Moreover, the
canon only affects candidates themselves, not their campaign committees.12 0
The law in Citizens United, by contrast, restricted the ability to make independ-
ent expenditures and singled out certain speakers (corporations) for unfavora-
ble treatment.12 1 These distinctions matter in election law cases. Under Burdick,
the Court might not have had to apply strict scrutiny in Williams-Yulee because
of this earlier burden analysis. By contrast, current campaign finance doctrine
puts off the consideration of these differences until after choosing a level of
scrutiny.122
There are some indications that the Court might be open to switching to
the Burdick test. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court told
states that more common and plausible justifications for campaign contribu-
tion limits would require less evidentiary support.2 Then, in Randall v. Sorrell,
the Court said that the dollar amount of a contribution limit must be examined
for its "proportionality" to the state's interests.' 24 Additionally, in Buckley v.
Valeo and more recent cases, the Court has stated that the constitutionality of
disclosure requirements depends on "the extent of the burden that they place
116. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) ("The law before us is an outright ban,
backed by criminal sanctions.").
117. Burdick, So4 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
118. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion).
11g. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
120. Contra McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 (striking down a law that imposed aggregate limits on
donations both to individual candidates and campaign committees).
121. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337, 341.
122. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003) ("It is not that the difference between a ban
and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at
the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.").
123. 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened
judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausi-
bility of the justification raised.").
124. 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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on individual rights."1 25 And there are more direct signals: Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg have explicitly called for the Court to "balance[] interests," rather
than presume unconstitutionality, in campaign finance cases. 126
The Williams-Yulee decision itself also showed hints, however faint, of
moving in this direction. The majority often deferred to Florida's judgments
the same way it would with a typical election regulation. For instance, it ac-
cepted Florida's stated interest in maintaining the appearance of judicial impar-
tiality even though this interest "does not easily reduce to precise definition" or
"lend itself to proof by documentary record." 127 This looks much like the
Court's voter ID cases, in which the Court has accepted states' alleged interests
in deterring voter fraud despite the lack of evidence that in-person voter fraud
poses a real problem. 1 28 If the Williams-Yulee Court had invoked the Burdick
test, it likely would have given Florida a lower bar to meet. Instead, it wrote "a
casebook guide to eviscerating strict scrutiny any time the Court encounters"
activity "it dislikes" - in any area of First or Fourteenth Amendment law. 129
Importing campaign finance into election law doctrine would not require a
complete overhaul of the Court's First Amendment precedents. Just as Anderson
did not overturn the Warren Court's election law cases that applied strict scru-
tiny, stare decisis could keep most past campaign finance cases intact. But as
the analysis of Williams-Yulee shows, and as the history of election regulation
jurisprudence also illustrates, 13 o the gap between Burdick and across-the-board
strict scrutiny could make a real difference in future cases.
125. 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam); see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) ("[T]he
strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on
First Amendment rights.").
126. Shrink Mo.Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). Both Justices renewed their
calls for less-than-strict scrutiny in Williams-Yulee. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct.
1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1675 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
127. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667 (majority opinion).
128. See Crawford v. Marion Cry. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194-96 (2008) (plurality opinion);
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam). The Court also used deferential lan-
guage normally reserved for rational basis review, saying phrases like "Florida has reasona-
bly determined" and "a State may conclude." Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1669, 1671.
129. Willians-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13o. See cases cited supra notes 69, 102-104, in which the Court upheld regulations that likely
would not have survived an across-the-board strict scrutiny standard.
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C. The Counterargument: Campaign Finance as Individual Right
Despite the Court's occasional moves toward a balancing test, it has resisted
explicitly adopting the Burdick test. Indeed, the Court has suggested that Bur-
dick applies only to laws that "control the mechanics of the electoral process,"
and not to "regulation[s] of pure speech.""' Though the Court has never di-
rectly addressed the use of the Burdick test in campaign finance cases,132 there
are two main counterarguments to the idea of folding campaign finance into
the Burdick framework. Justice Thomas has articulated the first, more practical
objection: using the Burdick test would make little difference, according to him,
because all "restrictions on core political speech so plainly impose a 'severe
burden."'133 But the Court's analysis in Williams-Yulee shows that burdens on
speech are not always severe. Justice Thomas seems to think that political
speech rights deserve the utmost constitutional protection, regardless of the
magnitude of the intrusion.' 3 4 Though his concern is legitimate, cases like Wil-
liams-Yulee illustrate the danger of such an absolute rule.
There is also a more theoretical reason why some might wish to separate
campaign finance from other election regulations. At its most fundamental lev-
el, campaign finance may seem less regulable than voting rights or ballot ac-
cess. The Court created the Burdick test because, "as a practical matter, there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest
and if some sort of order . . . is to accompany the democratic processes."1as A
balancing test protects constitutional rights while still allowing the government
to safeguard the integrity of its elections. One might argue, however, that Con-
gress and the states do not have the same need to regulate campaign finance.
After all, campaign contributions and expenditures fund the very discussion of
public issues that is central to the First Amendment's purpose.'"' Moreover,
131. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995).
132. The Court has, however, addressed the Burdick test as related to a prohibition on distrib-
uting anonymous handbills. See id. at 345-47. The rationale for rejecting Burdick in this cir-
cumstance is similar to the one discussed below. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying
text.
133. Bucldey v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 208 (1999) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
134. See id.
135. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974)).
136. See Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("The Act's contribution and ex-
penditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activi-
ties.").
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states are perfectly capable of holding elections without campaign finance regu-
lations; twelve states do not limit individual campaign contributions, and thir-
teen allow unlimited contributions from political action committees.13 As one
scholar put it, "[e]lectoral mechanisms by their nature require government ac-
tion," while "expressive activity requires no government regulation outside the
general rules of property, tort, and contract." if one believes that the gov-
ernment has very little interest in regulating political speech, then the theoreti-
cal basis for using a balancing test disappears." 9
But even this rationale does not hold up. The Buckley Court explicitly rec-
ognized that Congress has the power to regulate federal elections, including
through campaign finance restrictions.14 0 More importantly, even the Roberts
Court has accepted that the government has a compelling interest in regulating
campaign finance.' 4 ' From Buckley onward, the Court's decisions reflect the fact
that campaign finance law is "an area in which the election domain and the
domain of public discourse both have strong claims."14 2 The government has a
deep interest in regulating campaign finance to ensure the integrity of elec-
137. Brian Cruikshank, Contribution Limits Overview, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limits-overview
.aspx [http://perma.cc/XAE4-7SQY].
138. McGinnis, supra note 13, at 908. It should be noted that electoral mechanisms do not neces-
sarily require state action. "For much of the nineteenth century," for instance, "voters had
obtained their ballots from political parties." ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE:
THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 115 (2009). Each party
made its ballot a different color and size and included only the names of the candidates of
that party; the voter needed only, to drop the ballot in the ballot box, while party officials
made sure that people voted the right way. Id. One of today's most basic state election func-
tions - the printing and provision of ballots - did not become widespread until the late
18oos. Id.
139. See, e.g., Dan Tokaji & Allison Hayward, Debate, The Role ofJudges in Election Law, 159 U.
PA. L. REv. 273, 291 (2011). McGinnis also argues that courts should not defer to legislatures
on the constitutionality of their campaign finance laws because speech at election time can-
not be separated from ongoing political debate. McGinnis, supra note 13, at 908. However,
the courts have shown themselves capable of drawing lines to prevent the diminution of
such speech. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007). The Bur-
dick test, with its focus on measuring the burden on constitutional rights, allows courts to
tailor their scrutiny based on how wide a speech-regulating net laws cast.
140. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13-14.
141. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("[W]e do
not doubt the compelling nature of the 'collective' interest in preventing corruption in the
electoral process.").
142. James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Re-
ply, 97 VA. L. REv. 633, 645 n.44 (2011); see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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tions, just as it does with voting rights, political parties, or ballot access. "From
a constitutional perspective," then, "decisions about whether to structure the
financing of elections are not so obviously different from other decisions that
are currently far less controversial about how to structure elections.""'
Moreover, as mentioned above,14 4 there is some evidence from previous
cases that the Court may have been willing to move toward a sliding-scale test
for campaign finance laws in substance, even if it has refused to do so explicit-
ly.145 First, the Court has applied the Burdick test to the very rights that it says
campaign finance laws abridge. For instance, contribution limits primarily
burden donors' and candidates' freedom of association,14 6 but the Burdick test
is routinely applied to association claims.' And, as Buckley v. American Consti-
tutional Law Foundation shows, the Court has even been willing to apply the
Burdick test to laws that regulate core political speech.'4 " Second, the Court has
admitted that it has "subjected strictures on campaign-related speech that [it
has] found less onerous to a lower level of scrutiny."14 9 In theory, at least, the
two-tiered scrutiny of campaign finance is already somewhat similar to the
Burdick test, except that the Court determines the burdens imposed by an en-
tire category of laws rather than focusing on the severity of the particular statute
at issue."'
The Court has recently begun to grapple with this theoretical debate, as ev-
idenced by the dueling opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC. In the plurality opinion,
Chief Justice Roberts suggests that the First Amendment protects individuals
against any collective interests that campaign finance laws might further."s' Ac-
143. Pildes, supra note 7, at 26.
144. See supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
145. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review ofElectoral Mechanics: Explanations
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 357-61 (2007); Elmendorf & Foley, supra note ii, at
510-11; Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in
Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 889-90 (2007); Steph-
anopoulos, supra note 11, at 292.
146. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976) (per curiam).
147. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 436 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983).
148. See 525 U.S. 182, 186-87, 191-92 (1999).
149. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 735 (2011) (emphasis
added).
i5o. The standards are not in reality applied this way, since the difference between closely drawn
and strict scrutiny has shrunk significantly in the past decade. See supra note 42 and accom-
panying text.
151. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449-50 (2014) (plurality opinion).
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cording to Chief Justice Roberts, the public interest in regulating campaigns
must not "truncate th[e] tailoring test at the outset";15 2 he therefore rejects any
"ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits."5 3 In contrast, Justice
Breyer's dissent treats political speech as serving not just individual speakers'
rights, but also a broader public purpose: "seek[ing] to form a public opinion
that can and will influence elected representatives."s' Because campaign fi-
nance laws are rooted in the First Amendment's core purpose -to "create a de-
mocracy responsive to the people" - they should be seen "as seeking in signifi-
cant part to strengthen, rather than weaken, the First Amendment.""'s
According to this vision of the First Amendment, the regulation of campaign
finance is as necessary to the integrity of elections as the regulations the Burdick
test was designed to protect.
CONCLUSION
Williams-Yulee was the result of two conflicting realities. Campaign finance
regulations serve a vital purpose: protecting the integrity of our political sys-
tem.s'5 Yet the Court has steadily ratcheted up its scrutiny of those regula-
tions.' Up to this point, this has not caused a problem. The Court has been
quite willing to employ strict scrutiny because it has been happy to strike down
most campaign finance regulations.'15  But in Williams-Yulee, the Court finally
reaped what it had sown: it confronted a regulation that was too important to
strike down, but which existing jurisprudence suggested it had to subject to
strict scrutiny.
Using the Burdick test, the Court could have avoided this problem. Even
now, after Williams-Yulee, the Court can and should evaluate campaign finance
laws under the Burdick framework. By examining the character and magnitude
of the harm before applying a level of scrutiny, courts would have greater flexi-
bility to account for the specific characteristics of different campaign finance
restrictions. Instead, the Court has undermined its traditional free speech ju-
152. Id. at 1450.
153. Id. at 1449 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
154. Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1468.
156. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2oo) ("[C]ontribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integri-
ty of the [electoral] process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate.").
157. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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risprudence, giving governments a roadmap to defeating strict scrutiny across
the board.
Williams-Yulee's evisceration of strict scrutiny illustrates the benefits of
switching to the Burdick test. It also highlights the potential dangers of letting
campaign finance decisions drive the Court's broader First and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. Campaign finance cases involve legal considera-
tions unique to the electoral domain and sometimes do not get the benefit of
factual development in the lower courts."' This increases the danger that the
Court could announce rules in the campaign finance context that have unin-
tended and destabilizing consequences in other First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment areas. The Court should save campaign finance from First Amendment
doctrine - and save First Amendment doctrine from campaign finance.
NOAH B. LINDELL*
is. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 n-4 (plurality opinion); id. at 1479-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 399-400 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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